MILF LAMENTS GOVERNMENT'S "TRADITIONAL" APPROACH TO PEACE

by ROMMEL C. BANLAOI

Published in Newsbreak on September 5, 2011

MAGUINDANAO, Philippines– “Political solution is needed to solve the armed conflicts in Mindanao,” said Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Chairman, Al haj Murad Ebrahim, in a press conference held in Camp Darapanan in Maguindanao on Monday, Sept. 5, 2011. He argued that the struggle of the Bangsamoro people for self-determination is a political problem that requires a political solution.

Murad lamented, however, that the Philippine government is still holding on to a traditional approach that only offers a “palliative solution” to the real problem.

Murad argued that the government’s “3 in 1” approach that offers “instant” solution to the Bangsamoro problem is unacceptable to the MILF as it avoids substantive issues that challenge the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

According to Murad, “The government is only managing and not solving the problem if it insists on using the unconstitutionality of the MILF proposal.” He added that the 11-point proposal of the government that emphasizes economic development and recognition of the Bangsamoro identity and history can be unilaterally implemented by the government even without a negotiation.

“What we need is a sub-state that is truly autonomous and that can stand alone without the control of Malacanang,” said Murad. The present Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) “is nothing but the administrative arm of Manila.” He pointed out that the reform of the ARMM will not guarantee the right of the Bangsamoro people for self-determination.

Despite its rejection of the government proposal, the MILF continues to adhere to the peace talks. Murad, however, emphasized that, “For people to have faith in the peace process, parties should respect agreements and must have the political will to be creative and innovative in addressing the Bangsamoro self-determination issue”.

The MILF is apparently expressing its difference with the government’s view of the Mindanao conflict. The challenge for the Philippine government is how to address this difference and find a common ground in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities in Mindanao.– Newsbreak  (http://www.newsbreak.ph/2011/09/05/milf-laments-govts-traditional-approach-to-peace/)

PEACE AND STABILITY: WAY AHEAD IN THE SPRATLYS

BY ROMMEL C. BANLAOI

Originally published at the Philippine Star on July 13, 2011

Despite the current security tensions that can increase the risks of war due to clash of sovereignties in the Spratlys, peace and stability is still the way ahead in this contested body water.

There are four major reasons why.

First, all claimants, namely Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have all agreed to manage the disputes in the Spratlys peacefully. Though all sovereign states have the right to use force when their vital national interests are threatened, the use of force to settle international disputes is no longer the norm in international politics.

The principle of peaceful settlement of inter-state conflicts is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations (UN), in which all sovereign states are members of. The UN has also provided various mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in order to ameliorate the security dilemma of states in the condition of international anarchy.

The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea or DOC also articulates the maxim of pacific settlement of disputes. Although the DOC is non-binding for just being a declaration, all claimants refer to it when problems arise in the South China Sea.

Second, we now live in the era of globalization where all sovereign states have become so interconnected through commerce, trade, and tourism.    This interconnectedness is evident in the South China Sea through international navigation.

It is already well known that the South China Sea is one of the busiest sea routes in the world. In fact, the South China Sea is a maritime superhighway with at least 50,000 ships passing through its sea-lanes annually. Thus, waging a war in the Spratlys is costly for claimants and counter-productive for all states depending on the freedom of navigation in the area.

Third, though claimants are presently upgrading their military capabilities, they are not designed to invade other states or to occupy already occupied features in the Spratlys. They are designed to increase their capabilities to protect their occupied features and to patrol the waters covering them.   They are also designed to deter other claimants to make new occupations as required by the DOC.

If claimants have overlapping waters to patrol, they can sort our their differences through negotiations, either bilaterally or multilaterally.

Acquisition of submarines, frigates, corvettes, and offshore patrol vessels by claimants are not meant to support an “invasion” force. They are being acquired to primarily confront the growing non-traditional security threats in the maritime domain such as piracy and armed robbery against ships, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human trafficking and international terrorism.   Without those naval assets, “internal waters” and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of claimants will be prone to abuse by non-traditional sources of security threats. The current tensions in the Spratlys gave claimants a strong justification before their taxpayers to increase national budget for naval acquisitions.

Finally, the current tensions in the Spratlys are in fact blessings in disguise.   Through the current tensions, claimants are able to express their strategic intentions, something that were not expressed before. 

The current tensions gave all claimants a better understanding of the disputes and their respective national positions on the issue.    With this understanding, claimants will be more circumspect and nuanced in dealing with each other in order to avoid a war in the Spratlys.

If there are claimants anticipating an inter-state war in the Spratlys, they have not come to grips with the reality of globalization and complex interdependence of nations. They will become a pariah state whose behavior is not in sync with international norms of peaceful behavior.

Gov't-MILF Peace Talks: More Talks, Less Peace?

by Rommel C. Banlaoi

Originally published in Philippine Star on September 6, 2011

In a press conference in Camp Darapanan on 5 September 2011, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Chairman, Al haj Murad Ebrahim expressed his strong disappointments on the current status of the peace talks. 


“The peace talks will just be an exercise in futility if the direction of the peace process will not represent the aspiration of the Bangsamoro people,” Murad argued.

For the MILF, enjoying the right to self-determination is the real aspiration of the Bangsamoro people - something that is not fully guaranteed in the “3 in 1” peace proposal of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH).

Originally, the MILF regarded the right of the Bangsamoro people for self-determination to mean a creation of an independent and separate Islamic state.

But Murad stressed that the MILF already relaxed its concept of self-determination to mean a creation of sub-state – a Bangsamoro state “within” but “independent” of the Republic of the Philippines. He explained that a sub-state “is a fully autonomous political entity that is self-governing and can stand alone.” He said that the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) “is a failed experiment” because “it failed to stand alone” for having been just an administrative arm of Malacanang.

For the GPH, however, solving the armed conflicts in Mindanao must be consistent with the 1987 Philippine Constitution – something that the MILF regards as a big stumbling block in the peace process. The GPH argues that the MILF concept of a sub-state poses a challenge to the existing constitution. The government is bound by the terms of the constitution in the peace negotiation.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution says that the Philippines is a unitary state. Thus, the MILF concept of a sub-state is unconstitutional.

Apparently, there is a now a huge gap between the GPH and the MILF in their understanding on how to solve the armed conflicts in Mindanao. 

This gap is now creating an impasse in the current peace talks.

If not mutually resolved by the two parties, this impasse can develop into a deadlock that can pave the way to the resumption of hostilities in Mindanao, something that we, stakeholders of peace, do not want to happen.

But Murad said that “we are not yet at a deadlock.”

He underscored that “The MILF continues to adhere to the guidance of our revered leader, the late Salamat Hashim, that the peaceful, democratic and civilized was to resolve the conflict between the Bangsamoro and the Philippine Government is through negotiations.”

Murad lamented, however, that “As the negotiations drag on with no solution to the Bangsamoro Question on sight, some sector of the Bangsamoro society lost hope in the peace process.”

According to Murad, the MILF has been negotiating with the Philippine Government for the past 14 years. In these long years of negotiation, Murad said that the MILF already made its clear stand on how the Bangsamoro people can achieve their right to self-determination. Murad said that in the present negotiation, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. But the GPH peace proposal, he argued, “is bringing the negotiation back to zero.”

It is very sad to note that after 14 years of negotiations, what we have seen are more talks and less peace.

Maybe more talks are not enough. We need much more talks to finally achieve more peace in our land.

CLASH OF SOVEREIGNTIES IN THE SPRATLYS

by ROMMEL C. BANLAOI

Originally published at the Philippine Star on June 30, 2011


When the United States assured its friends and allies in Southeast Asia that it is committed to defend and assist them on rising tensions in the Spratlys, China just warned the US to back off and stay out of the South China Sea disputes.

China’s Vice foreign minister, Cui Tiankai, even stressed that “the United States is not a claimant state to the dispute. So, it is better for the United States to leave the dispute to be sorted out between the claimant states.”
With exemption of Taiwan, all claimants in the Spratlys are all sovereign states with a defined territory in which they should exercise full control. However, they have clash of sovereignties over some territories in the South China Sea called by Vietnam as East Sea and by the Philippines as West Philippine Sea.


China’s Indisputable Sovereignty

China claims “indisputable sovereignty” of all the waters and features in the South China covered within its so-called “nine-dashed lines” map submitted to the United Nations. However, China only occupies seven features in the Spratlys – Chigua Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef,  Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef.

All these reefs occupied by China have highly cemented structures. China maintains very impressive helipad facilities in Chigua Reef, Gaven Reef, and Johnson Reef. It has three-storey concrete building in Mischief Reef. All its facilities in the nine occupied features have dipole and parabolic disc antenna, search lights, solar panels, various types of radars and gun emplacements.


Taiwan’s Identical Sovereignty Claims with China

Taiwan has identical claims to sovereignty with China. Countries adopting a one-China policy regards Taiwan as a mere province of China. Thus, Taiwan’s sovereign claim in the South China Sea disputes is complicated. But it occupies the largest island in the Spratlys: the Itu Aba or Taiping Island that has an excellent helipad and a very long and highly cemented runway.


Vietnam’s Incontestable Sovereignty


Vietnam claims “incontestable sovereignty” of two island-groups in the South China Sea: the Paracels and the Spratlys. Clash of sovereignties in the Paracels only involved China and Vietnam (and to a certain extent Taiwan). In Spratlys, it involved Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Vietnam presently occupies 21 islands, reefs and cay in the Spratlys with impressive facilities.  Its largest occupied island, Lagos (or Spratly Island), is the most heavily fortified with a solid runway, a pier, at least 35 building structures, around 20 storage tanks, at least 20 gun emplacements, at least 5 battle tanks and some parabolic disk antennas and a spoon rest radar.

Aside from Lagos Island, Vietnam also maintains facilities at Pugad Island (Southwest Cay), which is just less than two nautical miles away from the Philippine occupied island of Parola (Northeast Cay).  Pugad Island has several gun emplacements, gun shelters, civilian buildings, military barracks, parabolic disc antennas, concrete bunkers, a light house, a football field, a helipad, and many light posts.

Other facilities of Vietnam in at least 14 occupied reefs seem to follow a standard pattern of construction.  South Reef, Pentley Reef, Discovery Great Reef, Collins Reef, Pearson Reef, Lendao Reef, West Reef, Ladd Reef, Central London Reef, East Reef, Cornwallis Reef, Pigeon Reef, Allison Reef, and Barque Canada Reef have identical structures featuring a golden-painted three-storey concrete building with built-in light house on top, gun emplacements on both sides, T-type pier, solar panels, parabolic disc antennas, and garden plots. 


The Philippines’ Sovereignty Claim Based on “dominium maris” and “la terre domine la mer”

The Philippines claims sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Spratlys within its Kalayaan Island Group (KIG). It regards KIG as an “integral part of the Philippines.”

The Philippines strengthens its sovereignty claim using the Roman principle of “dominium maris” and the international law principle of “la terre domine la mer,” which means that land dominates the sea.

Under this principle, the Philippines argues that it is exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters around the KIG or adjacent to each relevant geological features of the Kalayaan Island, which is under the local government control of the Municipality of Kalayaan.  The Philippines contends that this position is provided for under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Philippines ranks second in the most number of occupied areas in the Spratlys. It is presently in control of nine facilities that are considered parts of the Municipality of Kalayaan: Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal, Kota (Loaita) Island, Lawak (Nanshan) Island, Likas (West York) Island, Pag-Asa (Thitu) Island, Panata Island (Lankiam) Cay, Parola Island (Northeast Cay) Patag (Flat) Reef,  and Rizal (Commodore) Reef.

Its largest occupied facility is the  Pag-Asa Island, the closest island to the Chinese occupied Subi Reef.  Pag-Asa Island has an already deteriorating run-way maintained by the 570^th Composite Tactical Wing of the Philippine Air Force.  It also has a naval detachment maintained by the Naval Forces West of the Philippine Navy.  Pag-Asa island has municipal hall called Kalayaan Hall, a village hall called Barangay Pag-Asa, a police station maintained by the Philippine National Police (PNP), sports facilities, observation tower, a commercial mobile phone station, and several civilian houses and military barracks. 

The Philippines also maintains makeshift naval detachment facilities in five other islands, one reef and one shoal.  Its facilities in the Rizal Reef are just wooden structures  and two small single-storey hexagonal concrete buildings manned by four personnel of the Philippine Navy.

The Philippines also maintains a naval detachment in Ayungin Shoal established out of a dilapidated Landing Ship Tank called LST 57.  Ayungin Shoal is the closest structure of the Philippines to the controversial Mischief Reef occupied by China.


Malaysia’s Sovereignty Claim Based on Continental Reef Principle

Malaysia’s claim to sovereignty in the Spratly is based on the continental reef principle outlined by UNCLOS. As such, Malaysia claims 12 features in the Spratlys. But it only presently occupies six features: Ardasier Reef, Dallas Reef, Erica Reef, Investigator Shoal, Mariveles Reef, and Swallow Reef.

Malaysia has well-maintained facilities in the Swallow Reef.  This reef has a diving center called “Layang-Layang”.  Swallow Reef has a resort-type hotel, swimming pool, windmills, communication antennas, control communication tower, civilian houses, military barracks and a helipad.

Malaysia also has a very good facility in the Ardasier Reef with an excellent helipad, sepak takraw court, gun emplacements and control tower.  The facilities in the Ardasier Reef are almost identical with the Malaysian facilities in Erica Reef, Mariveles Reef and Investigator Shoal.    Malaysia also maintains a symbolic obelisk marker in the Louisa Reef being claimed by Brunei.


Brunei Sovereignty Claim Based on EEZ

Brunei’s claim to sovereignty in the Spratlys is based on the principle of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) provided for by UNCLOS. It provides coastal states 200 nautical miles EEZ in which coastal states have sovereign right to exploit resources of the area.

Brunei does not occupy any feature in the Spratlys. But it asserts that the Louisa Reef being claimed by Malaysia is part of Brunei’s EEZ.


Managing Contested Sovereignty Claims in the Spratlys

The Spratly dispute is a complex case of contested sovereignty claims. Because of the strategic value of the Spratlys, which is proven to have enormous oil and natural gas resources not to mention its very rich marine resources, it is very unlikely for all claimants to surrender their sovereignty claims.

All claimants rule out the use of force to resolve their maritime disputes in the Spratlys. But they continue to upgrade their military capabilities to assert their respective claims.

They also use UNCLOS as the basis of their claims. But they seldom use UNCLOS to manage their differences. China prefers to manage the Spratly disputes bilaterally. But other claimants want to internationalize the issue.
With the Spratly disputes now upped the ante, tensions can furhter escalate if claimants remains intransigent in their sovereignty claims.

To manage disputes in the Spratlys peacefully, claimants may consider anew the shelving of sovereignty issues and be more pragmatic in exploring the possibilities of joint development. This is an option that can put claimants in a win-win situation.

RISK OF WAR IN THE SPRATLYS

by ROMMEL C. BANLAOI

Originally Published at Newsbreak on June 29, 2011 

While the Philippines and the US were launching their naval exercises on June 28, 2011 in the waters of Sulu and Palawan, which are very close to the disputed Spratly Islands in the West Philippine Sea, an Australian-based think-tank, the Lowy Institute, warned of a growing risk of war in the East China and South China Seas.

In its report entitled Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia authored by Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs and Justin Jones, the Lowy Institute asserts that China’s growing military and rising resource needs from the disputed waters of East China and South China Seas have developed into a “risk-taking behavior” of Beijing.

This behavior makes the country in friction not only with the claimants in the Spratlys, namely Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam but also with other major powers, particularly with the United States, Japan and India.

The report underscores, “China’s frictions with the United States, Japan and India are likely to persist and intensify. As the number and tempo of incidents increases, so does the likelihood that an episode will escalate to armed confrontation, diplomatic crisis or possibly even conflict.”

The report also exclaims, “The sea lanes of Indo-Pacific Asia are becoming more crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed strife. Naval and air forces are being strengthened amid shifting balances of economic and strategic weight. The changing deterrence and warfighting strategies of China, the United States and Japan involve expanded maritime patrolling and intrusive surveillance, bringing an uncertain mix of stabilising and destabilising effects.”

Coinciding with the release of this report is the press statement delivered a few days earlier by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei who says that  China has a  foreign policy  that “sticks to the path of peaceful development, upholds the defense policy that is defensive in nature and commits itself to actively developing friendship and cooperation with countries around the world, especially neighboring countries.”

However, China’s neighbors in Southeast Asia, particularly the claimants in the Spratlys, strongly doubt the sincerity of Beijing to implement its policy of peaceful development considering the unprecedented rise of its military power that is believed to have already acquired a blue water capability.

China has scheduled sea trials of its first Aircraft Carrier on July 1.  It is expected that this aircraft carrier will cruise the waters near the Spratlys.

Uneasy peace

The growing visibility of Chinese ships patrolling the contested waters of the Spratlys has, in fact, made its neighbors  terribly uneasy.

This has prompted the US to reaffirm its commitment to defend its allies and partners in Asia amidst the risk of war in the region.

Apparently, the prospects of war and peace in the Spratlys largely depend now on the current and future behavior of China.

As the traditional “Middle Kingdom” in Asia, China is currently at the middle of various suspicions because of the many uncertainties associated with its military rise.

These uncertainties create security anxieties of its neighbors who will inevitably gang-up against China if China fails to assuage the fear of its neighbors.

Major power competitors like the US, Japan and India will take advantage of this situation to form a loose coalition of democratic states to check China’s growing might.

The fear of China will also encourage the Philippines and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to bandwagon with the US, Japan and India in order to hedge against the ascendant China.

There is no doubt that China has to do a lot of enormous explaining to  effectively convince its neighbors that its growing military power and  increasing visibility in the Spratlys will not pose risks of war.

Otherwise, China will create an international environment not conducive for its peaceful development.—Newsbreak

EMERGING COLD WAR IN THE SPRATLYS

by ROMMEL C. BANLAOI

Originally published at the Philippine Star on June 24, 2011



In an official meeting with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario on 23 June 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton assured that the US is committed to defend the Philippines amidst rising security tensions in the South China Sea, which the Philippine government now calls as West Philippine Sea.

To operationalize this commitment, Secretary Clinton stressed that the US would provide the Philippines affordable and reliable military equipment in order to enhance the external defense capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly in defending its territories in West Philippines Sea. The AFP is now preparing a “shopping list” of military hardware it wants from the US.

So far, these words of Secretary Clinton are the most reassuring statements ever expressed by a top US official on the state of Philippines-American security relations.

Since 1951, the Philippines and the US have been military allies through the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). This placed the Philippines on the side of the US in the cold war against the former Soviet Union.

But their strong military relations became practically moribund with the termination in 1991 of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA). The termination of MBA coincided with end of the cold war between the US and the former Soviet Union.   When the US withdrew its last remaining troops from Clark and Subic in 1992, their military relations reached its lowest moment leading to the rapid deterioration not only of Philippines-American alliance but also of Philippine military capabilities.

China took advantage of this moment when it passed a law in 1992 declaring the whole of South China Sea as part of its internal waters. US reaction was ambiguous and underscored that it would remain neutral on the Spratly issue.

However, Chinese occupation of the Panganiban (Mischief) Reef in 1995 prompted the US and the Philippines to fashion a new type of military relationship in order to respond to a China challenge in the Spratlys. In 1999, the Philippine Senate ratified the Philippines-American Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to justify the presence of American troops conducting joint and combined military exercises with the AFP in Philippine territories. The VFA is said to have provided operational substance to the MDT, which serves as the cornerstone of Philippines-American security alliance.

Despite the signing of the VFA, the US maintained its “strategic ambiguities” on the Spratly issue and declared its “hands off” position on the maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

While the VFA renewed Philippines-American security relations, it failed to actually revive their military alliance. The China challenge in the Panganiban Reef at that time was not enough justification for US troops to become visibly involved in Philippine security.  

Things changed in 2001 when the US used the VFA to justify American presence in the Philippines as part of the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

The GWOT reinvigorated the once dormant Philippines-American alliance. The GWOT even led to the signing of the Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA) in 2002 and the establishment of US Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTFP) Headquarters in Zamboanga City thereafter. The threat of terrorism, therefore, encouraged the Philippines and the US to work closely together.

China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea is now being viewed in the Philippines and the US not only as a security challenge, but more of a military threat. This is the context on why Secretary Clinton strongly expressed US commitment to defend the Philippines amidst tensions in the Spratlys.

Secretary Clinton’s statement indicates the emerging cold war between the US and China in the Spratlys.
A cold war is a situation where at least two major powers are involved in a security tension and subdued military hostility short of an actual military battle. Conflicts are expressed through proxy wars, military coalitions, propaganda, espionage, and even trade competitions. This situation is now emerging between the US and China in the contested Spratly group of islands.

Indications of an emerging cold war in the Spratly started to manifest in March 2009 when five Chinese ships “harassed” USS Impeccable, a US Navy minesweeper. The Chinese government claimed that the US ship was intruding in China’s internal water, which was regarded by the US government as an international water where all ships can enjoy free or innocent passage.

The emerging cold war between the US and China on the Spratly issue is also manifested in the exchange of words between the two powers in various international forums like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Shangrila Dialogue, and various meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) involving the two powers.

The US exclaims that the US has a national security interest in the South China Sea. China, on the other hand, asserts that the South China Sea forms part of its core interests at par with Taiwan and Tibet. China, which says that it remains committed to the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts, wants the US out of the South China Sea Disputes. But the US reiterates its willingness to get involved in the peaceful management of disputes in the Spratly while assuring its allies in the region of US military assistance.

The Philippines is now inevitably involved in an emerging cold war between the US and China in the Spratly. As an American ally, the Philippines is apparently on the side of the US in this emerging situation.

But will the Philippine government allows itself to get involved in a proxy war between the US and China when the cold war in the Spratly reaches its peak?

This situation is something that all sovereign states have to prevent to happen.

WORD WAR IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: A DIPLOMATIC CRISIS IN PHILIPPINES-CHINA RELATIONS/

BY ROMMEL C. BANLAOI

Originally published at the Philippine Star on June 10, 2011



While commemorating the 36^th anniversary of the establishment of Philippines-China Relations signed on 9 June 1975, China Ambassador to the Philippines, Liu Jianchao, exclaimed that the Philippines’ protests against China on the Reed Bank and Iroquois Reef-May Douglas Bank incidents were all based on “bad rumors”.

Referring particularly to the Iroquois Reef-May Douglas Bank incident, the Chinese Ambassador stressed, “It’s a bad rumor because we have no intention of occupying one of the islands. We clarified the reaction which was aimed at seismic survey that was done there so this is something that should not be played up because after all it’s just a survey not by military vessels but vessels for the survey.”

The ambassador has also reiterated the long-standing position of China that the South China Sea belongs to China and its “ownership” of the said water is “indisputable.” He even tells other claimants to the disputes, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, “to stop searching the possibility of exploiting resources in the area where China has claims.”  The ambassador also underscores that if the countries with claims in the South China want to explore and exploit any resources in the disputed water, “you can talk to China about the possibility of having a joint cooperation development and exploitation of natural resources.”

The Philippines, however, maintains its “firm stand” that the Reed Bank and the Iroquois Reef-May Douglas Bank belong to its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) where the country has all the exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the area. Presidential spokesman Edwin Lacierda said that the Philippines was only protesting “incursions into Philippine territorial waters by Chinese vessels.” Despite the strong statement of the Chinese ambassador against the Philippines protests, Lacierda stated that the Philippines will continue its activities in its EEZ, especially the oil exploration activities in the Reed Bank.

These exchanges of strong words between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea Dispute indicate the seemingly irreconcilable difference between the two countries on the issue. Both countries are now engaged in a word war, which poses a great diplomatic challenge in Philippines-China Relations. If not carefully managed, this word war can deteriorate into a diplomatic crisis that both countries do not want to happen.

The word war between the Philippines and China on the South China Sea Dispute is happening at the time when both countries should be joyfully celebrating the 36^th year of their bilateral relation, which in 2005 was just declared to have reached the “golden age of partnership”.

This year, however, sees the sudden deterioration of Philippines-China relation as a result of conflicting claims in the South China Sea. The word war between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea Dispute has created unnecessary ill-feelings on both sides that if not assuaged properly can make both countries at odd with each other.

Since 1975, when the Philippines and China normalized their diplomatic relations, their partnership has become comprehensive spanning cultural, economic, political and even military areas. This comprehensive partnership even led to the signing of the Joint Action Plan for Strategic Cooperation in 2009 as a living testament of their deepening friendship and growing partnership for mutual benefits.   The Philippines even celebrated the 35^thanniversary of Philippines-China Relations in Nanning, China in 2010 on the occasion of 7^th China-ASEAN Expo.

The year 2011, however, is one of the worst years in Philippines-China Relations after the Mischief Reef controversy in 1995 and the Scarborough Shoal incident in 1997.

It looks very impossible for China and the Philippines to give up their respective claims in the South China Sea because of the growing demand from both countries to access and exploit the valuable resources, particularly oil/gas and fish, in the disputed water. But if both governments will continue to exchange harsh words against each other on the issue, it will not only harm state-to-state relations, it will also affect people-to-people contacts.

If both countries are really serious in pursuing peaceful means to settle their differences, they have to mutually exercise self-restraint in publicly criticizing each other by exchanging harsh words so that government-level “misunderstanding” will not spill-over to the misunderstanding of their people.

Blog sites and networking sites are now filled with comments from citizens of their countries lambasting one another. If this trend continues, government-level differences can trigger racial outrage that will further  inflict harm on Philippines-China relations.

The Philippines and China have already made tremendous accomplishments in their bilateral relations over the past 36 years. The South China Sea Dispute shall not be the reason why both countries have to retrogress in their ties.

While there is no doubt that the Philippines and China have conflicting stand on the South China Sea Dispute, their commitment to settle their territorial disputes by peaceful means shall be strongly emphasized in public discourse. Rather than focus on their differences, both countries shall concentrate in discussing issues of mutual interests and make sure that issues of mutual interests will redound to their citizens. In this case, the positive aspects of Philippines-China relations can establish social ownership.

As an interim measure, the Philippines and China shall seriously start talking about joint development in the South China Sea. Rather than determining which countries have ownership or rights to the disputed territories in the South China Sea, the Philippines and China should open their channels of communication to candidly consider the idea of joint development so that when they celebrate the annual anniversary of their ties in the future, they will share common accomplishments rather than exchange harsh words.