I am tasked to talk about continuities and changes in US security strategy in Asia and the directions and challenges it poses to China-ASEAN relations.
Monday, September 19, 2011
CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN US SECURITY STRATEGY IN ASIA: DIRECTIONS AND CHALLENGES IN CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS
by ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
Presented at the International Conference, “New Changes in American Foreign Policy Toward East Asia and Southeast Asia and Sino-American Relations” organized by the Center for American Studies, of Jinan University, Guangzhou, China on 17-18 September 2011
There is no doubt that the United States continues to be the dominant world’s superpower. Though the US is currently suffering from huge public debt that is creating enormous economic problems for the American people (around 46 million of which now living below the poverty line) its military might, however, continues to be the number one in the world.
The US is the only military power with the capability of global deployment. No country at present has matched that capability. As such, the US can still wield tremendous influence in global politics and can effectively throw its great weight around despite its relative economic decline at present.
In Asia, the US is still regarded as a foremost superpower despite the uneasiness of some Asian countries on American superpower presence in the region.
American alliances with major powers in Asia (namely Japan and Australia) remain strong and enduring and continue to play an pivotal role for the maintenance of regional stability. The US is also solidifying its existing military alliances with other Asian countries like the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand while enhancing its defense relations with other countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia.
These military alliances and defense partnership with key Asian countries are essential for the US to play a stabilizing role in the region.
Since the end of the Second World War, American military alliances and defense relations in Asia have served as cornerstones of security and stability in the Asia Pacific region. These serve as the major sources of continuity in US security strategy in Asia – to make these military alliances and defense relations work not only for regional stability but specifically for American security that is currently facing many gargantuan challenges.
However, the luster of American power in Asia is slowly fading, if not disappearing, because of the rise of other powers such as China and India.
The economic rise of China and India is now changing the balance of power in Asia. This has prompted one scholar to describe the 21st century as the “post-American world”. This new situation warrants an adjustment in US strategy towards Asia to make US presence more relevant in this highly dynamic region.
The 2010 US National Security Strategy is the key document that vividly describes continuities and changes in US security strategy in Asia at present.
In this document, the US still gives high premium on the role of its military power as the main guarantor of American security. It says that the American Armed Forces “will always be a cornerstone of our security” – a hallmark of foreign and security policy that is greatly informed by the principle of realism.
Thus, military or hard power is the US main comparative advantage with other rising powers in Asia.
But the US is cognizant of the fact that military power alone cannot wield the necessary influence it needs in the rapidly changing world of Asian international politics. It realizes the 21st century international politics is different from the past centuries of international relations. With the advent of globalization that increases the complex interconnectedness of many sovereign Asian nations, the US has accommodated some changes in its strategy in Asia by utilizing its soft power to wield global influence and maintain its regional relevance.
Thus, the 2010 US National Security Strategy provides some important changes in its security strategy in Asia by stressing the importance of its soft power. It recognizes that American security “also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice system and work seamlessly with other countries.”
As a winning strategy, the US, under the administration of President Barrack Obama, is also now using American smart power. The concept of smart power, which is officially declared by the Obama Administration through US State Department Secretary Hilary Clinton, combines the strength of its hard and soft powers.
The use of American smart power is deemed necessary for the promotion of global peace and maintenance of regional stability. It simply means becoming more clever in using its many sources of national power in order to maintain its global influence and regional relevance in Southeast Asia.
The major continuity in US national security strategy is the American obsession to maintain the global leadership it enjoyed in the 20th century. Renewing American leadership in the 21st century, particularly in Asia, is the main objective of President Obama in its current national security strategy. The 2010 US National Security Strategy elaborates:
Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century. We will do so by building upon the sources of our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of our time. This strategy recognizes the fundamental connection between our national security, our national competitiveness, resilience, and moral example. And it reaffirms America’s commitment to pursue our interests through an international system in which all nations have certain rights and responsibilities. This will allow America to leverage our engagement abroad on behalf of a world in which individuals enjoy more freedom and opportunity, and nations have incentives to act responsibly, while facing consequences when they do not.
Yet, American leadership in Asia is currently being challenged by the rise of other major powers in Asia. Among major Asian powers, China is posing the most formidable challenge to American leadership in the region.
There is a popular notion that China is a rising power in Asia. I do not believe in this notion because China is not a rising power. China is already a risen power.
China assures the international community that its rise to power is peaceful and benign through its policy of peaceful development.
In its newly published White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development, the State Council declares that “peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization, make itself strong and prosperous, and make more contribution to the progress of human civilization.”
More importantly, China explains that seriously pursuing the policy of peaceful development is essential not only for its own peace and progress but for the peace and progress of the whole of humanity. It elaborates:
The Chinese nation loves peace. From their bitter sufferings from war and poverty in modern times, the Chinese people have learned the value of peace and the pressing need of development. They see that only peace can allow them to live and work in prosperity and contentment and that only development can bring them decent living. Therefore, the central goal of China's diplomacy is to create a peaceful and stable international environment for its development.
However, American security officials and defense analysts continue to doubt the strategic intention of China as an emerging world power. This is a big continuity in US security strategy in Asia – a strategy of ambivalence when its comes to its relations with China.
At the same time, however, there is a change in US security strategy in Asia under Obama – a more China-focused US Asian strategy in the 21st century compared to the Japan-focused US Asian strategy in the 20th century.
The current American National Security Strategy aptly declares that the US will pay more attention to China in this current century because the rise of China is already creating tremendous impact on the US strategic interests in Asia. The White House asserts that it “will monitor China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that US interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected.” The US also commits to “encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, and prosperity as its influence rises.”
The annual report to Congress of the US Department of Defense (DOD) on the Military and Security Development of China reveals American perception of the growing military power of China.
In its 2010 Report, the DOD expresses serious concerns that the “pace and scope of China’s military modernization have increased over the past decade.” This increased military modernizations has enabled China’s armed forces “to develop capabilities to contribute to the delivery of international public goods, as well as increase China’s options for using military force to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favor.”
Thus, the US finds it imperative to adjust its Asian security strategy in the 21st century in order to meet the challenge of China’s ascending power.
Towards this end, one important aspect of the fundamental changes in US security strategy in Asia is the serious fortification of its existing alliances in Asia, particularly with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The US regards its Asian allies as “force multipliers” that can be used to balance if not to necessarily contain China. It contends:
Alliances are force multipliers: through multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions is always greater than if we act alone. We will continue to maintain the capacity to defend our allies against old and new threats. We will also continue to closely consult with our allies as well as newly emerging partners and organizations so that we revitalize and expand our cooperation to achieve common objectives. And we will continue to mutually benefit from the collective security provided by strong alliances.
Another aspect of current American security strategy in Asia is its deliberate and decisive move to build cooperation with “21st century centers of influence”.
It means that the US will deepen its comprehensive relationships with emerging powers in Asia such as India, Russia and even China. It also means pursuing a stronger American role in the region’s multilateral groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the East Asia Summit (EAS).
US dynamic relation with China is the key driver of the current American security strategy in Asia. In fact, US Asian security strategy is largely defined by its security strategy towards China.
The US has strongly declared a policy of pursuing “a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship with China.” The US even welcomes China to play “responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation.”
But the US is aware of the reality it has some differences with China on key strategic issues.
Nonetheless, the US has expressed hopes that their disagreements on some issues “should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest, because a pragmatic and effective relationship between the United States and China is essential to address the major challenges of the 21st century.”
How should China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) react to the continuities and changes in American security strategy in Asia?
That is something we need to further discuss in the open forum.
Thank you very much for your attention.
 Abraham M. Denmark & Brian M. Burton, “The Future of US Alliances in Asia”, Global Asia, Volume 5, Number 4 (Winter 2010).
 See Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: WW Norton and Company, 2008).
 The White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010).
 For a good background on this topic, see Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O’ Hanlon, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).
 The White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010).
 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
 The White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010), pp. 9-10.
 Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful Development (September 2011).
 The White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010), p. 51.
 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010).
 The White House, National Security Strategy (May 2010), p. 49.
 Ibid., p. 43.
Sunday, September 11, 2011
by ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
Delivered at the 5th National Convention of the Philippine Society for Industrial Security, Inc., held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City on 9 September 2011
A decade after September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, terrorism continues to pose an enormous threat not only to Philippine national security but also to regional stability and world peace.
This virulent threat is becoming more and more dynamic and is continuously evolving into a highly complex and uncompromising form that makes the threat even harder to prevent, if not to totally eliminate.
It has been said that 9/11 gave terrorism its new ugly face.
Ten years after 9/11, we now learned that terrorists have the ability to face-lift and change its already nasty image. It has the proclivity to innovate in order to survive the harsh environment of counter terrorism. Like a chameleon, terrorists can blend with their surroundings to evade arrest and pursue their clandestine operations.
The changing face of terrorism continues to pose a tremendous challenge for global, regional and national counter terrorism, particularly if law enforcement authorities have a static view and traditional understanding of the whole gamut of problems associated with this menace.
Globally, Al-Qaeda remains to be the main international terrorist group with worldwide influence.
However, the July 22, 2011 terrorist attacks on Norway that killed 76 persons have aptly demonstrated that Al Qaeda, which promotes Islamic Fundamentalism, does not have the monopoly of terrorism. Even a “lone wolf” embracing Christian Fundamentalism can also commit hideous terrorist acts.
Through the decisive counter-terrorism efforts of the United States supported by its allies and partners in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), Al-Qaeda’s original global infrastructure has been practically crippled. Its complex and carefully woven global network has been utterly discovered, effectively disrupted and some even totally paralyzed.
Al Qaeda founder, Osama bin Laden, is already dead. In fact, almost two-thirds of the original leaders and members of Al-Qaeda have been neutralized to date as a result of GWOT. Its central leadership has practically crumbled and its regional affiliates and adherents successfully dispersed.
After ten years of vigorously waging the war on terror, Al-Qaeda is no longer a strong notorious force as it used to be.
Al Qaeda is now having difficulties mounting another catastrophic attacks beyond its main areas of operations in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. With this, American President Barrack Obama, in his introduction to the current U.S. Counter Terrorism Strategy, proudly declares that Al Qaeda has been put “on the path to defeat”.
But that is not the reason for the whole world to be complacent.
While Al Qaeda has no doubt weakened ten years after 9/11, it is not yet a spent force. Al Qaeda may have been seriously wounded in battle, but it is not yet dead. It still gets its life support from remaining followers and inspired adherents worldwide.
Thus, there is still a need for us to be more anxious because Al Qaeda is still a wicked force to contend with. As stressed by US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, “We have made serious inroads in weakening al Qaeda. [But] there's more to be done. There are these nodes now in Yemen, in Somalia and other areas that we have to continue to go after."
The 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism prepared by the US State Department admits that Al Qaeda continues to pose a threat.
There is no doubt that Al Qaeda still has the malevolent intent and growing capabilities to wreak terrorist havocs. Some, if not many, of its regional affiliates and global adherents are still alive and ready to make trouble. Almost 500 Al Qaeda-linked and Al Qaeda-inspired commanders - with their own associate members worldwide numbering around 10,000 - are still active to disturb peace and undermine global, regional and Philippine national security.
In Pakistan alone, there are still around 300 fierce Al Qaeda fighters associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In Afghanistan, around 100 hardcore Al Qaeda operatives are still active and still getting support from Talibans. Even in the United States, there are at least 40 Americans who have traveled to Somalia to join the Al Qaeda inspired Al Shabab.
It is also important to note that some Moro rebels have also been reportedly affiliated with Al Shabab (locally known as Markasos Shabab). There are also reports of an undetermined number of Al Qaeda-inspired personalities staying in the Philippines.
Hence, there is a need for us to face the grim reality that ideology of Al Qaedaism lives on even after the death of Osama bin Laden.
The violent extremist ideology of Al Qaeda still resonates to like-minded groups worldwide such as Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Army of Great Britain, the Eastern Turkistan Movement of Xinjiang (China), the Al-Harakatul-Al Islamiya of the Philippines, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi of Pakistan, the Harkatul Jehadul Islami operating in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, and Jemaah Islamiyah of Indonesia, among many others.
Remaining masterminds of terror associated with Al Qaeda have proven to be very resilient, keenly observant and highly elusive.
Though Al Qaeda may have already lost its steam as a result of the series of democratic uprisings in the Arab world, it can still morph into a newer face under the leadership of Ayman Al Zawahiri whose brand of Islam contains the key ingredients for violent extremism. Al Zawahiri has even released a video last August 2011 urging Al Qaeda followers worldwide to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden.
Through the use of Internet and Islamic propagation activities, Al Qaeda still has the commitment to promote religious intolerance, particularly to young and gullible Muslim population worldwide. It can still inspire and instigate sectarian violence in conflict-affected areas of the world with disgruntled Muslim population that includes the Philippines. In fact, Al-Qaeda is producing a magazine called Inspire to spread its violent extremist ideology worldwide.
At present, Al Qaeda is already weak as a group.
But it can still throw its remaining weight around because Al Qaeda is still relatively influential as a movement.
As a movement, Al Qaeda has become a “complex adaptive system” that has the survival instinct to evolve by adjusting to its “constantly changing” environment. While Al Qaeda celebrates its victories, it also learns from its mistakes. As a complex adaptive movement, Al Qaeda now operates through what Seth Jones calls five tiers: central al Qaeda, affiliated groups, allied groups, allied networks, and inspired individuals.
Al Qaeda is still determined to destroy America and other Western targets.
Based on the seized documents of Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of his death, Al Qaeda planned to attack oil tankers to create economic chaos in the West. The US also warned of possible Al-Qaeda attacks in the mainland using a small plane. India has recently unearthed Al Qaeda plans to attack its major cities through its commander, Ilyas Kashmiri. Even in China, the Al Qaeda linked East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), based in Xinjiang Province where Uyghur separatists are active, is also planning future attacks.
In Egypt, the home country of the new Al Qaeda chief Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda has re-established a cell in Sinai to plan attacks, particularly against police stations. In Spain, a Islamic militant with a Moroccan descent was arrested for propagating violent extremism and for endorsing terrorist attacks on Western targets.
In mounting attacks, Al Qaeda has already mastered the use of suicide terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen - with a strong possibility of exporting these skills to the Philippines. Al Qaeda’s use of indiscriminate bombings of vulnerable targets has made terrorism its new repulsive face. The use of these skills continues to inform the present and future activities of its affiliates, adherents and followers around the world.
Worst, Al Qaeda is developing new explosives to wreak havoc.
Al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen have produced a new chemical bomb made of poison ricin, a white powdery toxin that if annihilated in malls, airports or subways is very lethal. Al Qaeda operatives in the United Kingdom have also created a new version of a liquid bomb, an improved version of the nitroglycerin explosive invented by Ramsey Yousef while in the Philippines in 1994.
In other words, Al Qaeda has weakened organizationally.
But the security threat it poses has not been totally eliminated.
Al Qaeda is battered, but it is still breathing and moving. It still has the great illusion of creating a Pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the Islamic world that includes Southeast Asia.
In Southeast Asia, the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has also weakened a decade after 9/11. Most of its key operatives have also been killed and arrested, particularly those responsible in the 2002 Bali bombing and other subsequent bombings in Indonesia and the Philippines. Some of its members have left terrorism behind as a result of serious rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
Like Al Qaeda, JI organizational set-up is already in utter disarray. Its original Mantiqi structure is practically demolished. In fact, JI has already lost its original luster and is now heavily factionalized.
However, terror threats in Southeast Asia persist because around 700 remaining JI members are still active in Java, Indonesia and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand.
Currently, JI is rapidly evolving into a new venomous form.
In Indonesia, for example, personalities recently accused of terrorist acts have ceased to identify themselves with JI. They have been identified with another group called Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) legally established by Abu Bakar Bashir who is also known to be a JI leader.
Among the known JI personalities in Indonesia, we need to pay attention to Aris Sumarsono.
Sumarsono is a JI military chief and a protégé of Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of JI. He is believed to have helped prepare the bombs used in the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.
Sumarsono is being rumored now to have already replaced Omar Patek who became the main link of Al Qaeda with JI. He was reported to have visited the Philippines and established links with the ASG and other Moro rebels. Sumarsono is also believed to have established links with Basit Usman, a master bomber operating in Central Mindanao.
Al Qaeda and JI influences have reached the Philippines through the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and some Muslim armed groups associated with Al Khobar Group (AKG) and the so-called Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
It is already a public knowledge that as early as the 1990s, Al Qaeda presence in the Philippines was already established through the activities of Mohammad Jamal Khalifa who is the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Ramsey Yousef, the perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, went to the Philippines in 1994 to hide and design the Bojinka Plot, which aimed to bomb the twin tower of New York City using 11 jetliners.
Khalik Sheid Mohammad, identified as the principal architect of 9/11 bombings, was also in the Philippines in 1995 to work with Yousef in designing the Bojinka Plot and the twin plots to assassinate Pope John Paul II and US President Bill Clinton. But the person that revealed Al Qaeda operations in the Philippines was Abdul Hakim Murad who was arrested in the Philippines in 1995 for his participation in the Bojinka Plot.
JI presence in the Philippines was also established in the late 1990s in Central Mindanao through a training camp in Mt. Cararao.
The 2000 Rizal Day Bombings were attributed to JI. Father Rahman Al Ghozi, JI principal bomb maker operating in the Philippines, confessed that he provided the necessary explosives for the 2000 Rizal Day Bombings. Nasir Abbas, a former JI instructor and now working for the Indonesian government on de-radicalization programs, admitted that he belonged to the JI Mantiqi 3 in the Philippines, which planned the 2000 Rizal Day Bombing.
In Mindanao, JI has become more of a trademark to describe foreign military jihadists entering the Philippines to preach the gospel of violent extremism. Locally, Abu Sayyaf calls them Java men if they are Indonesians.
Among the Moro armed groups in the Philippines, JI links with the ASG is more robust and active at present. Three high profile JI personalities, namely Marwan (Malaysian), Mauwiyah (Singaporean) and Qayyim (Indonesian) are still working or seeking refuge with ASG commanders. Other “low-profile” JI personalities operating in the Philippines have the following aliases: Sanusi, Bahar, Abu Jihad, Usman, Mustaqueem and Hamdan.
It is estimated that around 30 JI personalities are still in the Philippines hiding in Sulo, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi with ASG followers. Some are said to be operating in Central Mindanao together with Al Khobar, the so-called MILF-SOG and some personalities allegedly identified with the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighter (BIFF) now called Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) of Umbra Kato.
Speaking on BIFM, this new armed group can make the peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF problematic. With a current estimated strength of more than 1,000 armed followers (Kato has a self-proclaimed number of 5,000) pursuing an armed struggle to advance the Bangsamoro right for self-determination, the BIFM can make peace in Mindanao very elusive.
The BIFM has become a residual armed Moro group that is a party to the complex conflict in Mindanao but not a party to the now intractable peace process. BIFM reported ties with some personalities associated with the Misuari’s Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), JI, the so-called MILF-SOG and other armed groups complicate the already complex armed violence in the Southern Philippines.
Philippine law enforcement authorities tagged JI-MILF-SOG behind the August 2, 2011 bombing in Cotabato City that killed a person and wounding of 10 others. The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) used in the January 25, 2011 Makati bus bombing, on the other hand, carried the JI-Al Khobar-MILF-ASG signature called by explosive experts as the “Bandung device”.
The ASG is one of the groups suspected to be responsible for the Makati bus bombing that killed five persons and wounded at least 14 others.
The ASG, however, is already a very tiny group of less than 100-armed followers. Though the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has estimated the strength of the ASG to be around 400, followers of ASG are, in fact, difficult to estimate because of its links with various armed groups associated with local bandits, warlords, local politicians and even followers of the MILF and the MNLF.
ASG’s encounter with the Philippine Marines in Patikul, Sulo on July 28, 2011 (that led to the death of 7 and wounding of 21 Marines) has demonstrated that the ASG, though already weakened, is also not yet, strictly speaking, a spent force like its idol, Al Qaeda. The instruction of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III to crush the ASG is a tantamount admission that the ASG is still a very potent force to contend with.
Though the ASG continues to be a miniscule group compared with the strength of the AFP, it can still inflict tremendous damages against military forces not only because of ASG's mastery of the terrain but also because of ASG's new precarious combatants who are aggressively young and brutally bred in war.
Military forces are trained to fight the ASG. But new ASG combatants live to fight and they fight to live. There is now a new ASG whose followers are younger, more exuberant, more perilous and more enterprising.
The new ASG has become a loose network of a few Moro rebels operating with many young Muslim mercenaries who have become established bandits and hardened criminals engaged in extortions, arms smuggling, drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. Some ASG adherents are protected by local warlords and corrupt public officials who are entrepreneurs of violence in Mindanao.
As a result, the ASG has become so resilient. It gets its staying power from the predatory politics and violent economies of Mindanao that create individuals to embrace violent extremism and terrorism.
In short, terrorism emanating largely from ASG and its cohorts continue to pose serious threats to Philippine national security because terrorism is evolving to a form we never knew before.
Al Qaeda’s violent extremist ideology that endorses acts of terrorism still resonates to Muslim Filipinos who are disgruntled with the situation or not satisfied with their current socio-economic, political and personal conditions. This ideology is being used to justify barbaric acts of ASG for socio-economic, political and personal reasons. Remaining leaders of ASG prey on young and illiterate Muslim Filipinos to commit acts of terrorism.
The 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism laments that the Philippines continues to be one of the world’s terrorist safe havens despite the fact that terrorist acts in the country have declined in 2010.
While the global war on terror has given us a better understanding of terrorist threats ten years after 9/11, the present threat we face is dynamic and has the ability to metamorphose into something else in order to survive. Some threats have regrettably mutated into a more terrifying form with their growing nexus with crimes, banditry, clan conflicts, warlordism, and other expressions of armed violence.
The current terrorist threats we face, particularly in the Philippines, are deeply enmeshed with a host of many other issues associated with internal armed conflicts, private armed violence, warlordism, rido or clan warfare, personal vendetta, and ordinary crimes.
To confront the threat of terrorism, the Philippines passed in 2007 the Human Security Act, which serves as the country’s anti-terrorism law. But the government is currently facing difficulties in implementing this law.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also passed in 2007 the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. But ASEAN also has a problem enforcing this convention.
The more nuanced approach to address terrorist threats is found in the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006. This strategy promotes the four measures of counter terrorism, to wit:
· Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism
· Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
· Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard
· Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism
All these measures point to the inconvenient truth that terrorist threats cannot be addressed by the military or law enforcement authorities alone. Terrorist threats are deeply rooted in many complex issues that are beyond the capacities of law enforcement authorities to handle.
Thus, addressing terrorist threats requires a whole-of-government approach.
But the government cannot do it alone. It requires the support of the whole society. The whole-of-government approach in sync with the whole-of-society approach can lead to the whole-of-nation approach to combat terrorism.
But terrorism has a regional dimension needing a whole-of-region approach.
Implementing these approaches are easier said than done.
But it is important to say these in order to raise our awareness on the need to develop an innovative approach to confront a national security threat we call terrorism.